Abstract
This study explains why countries facing similar forced migration pressures differ in refugee recognition and admission, focusing on how democratic institutional constraints combine with income inequality. Democratic regimes normatively emphasize minority protection and the rule of law, yet their recognition rates often fall short of this expectation. The study argues that income inequality simultaneously generates capital’s opening pressure and the public’s exclusionary preferences, which the two institutional constraints process through different paths. Analyzing directed dyads of origin and host countries, it finds that within democracies income inequality is positively associated with recognition rates, contrary to the competition hypothesis. Electoral accountability conditionally weakens this association through interaction with inequality, whereas mass party institutionalization shows an independent negative association rather than an interactive one. Neither pattern reappears in the authoritarian subsample. These findings suggest that refugee admission is related less to inequality itself than to the democratic institutional pathways translating inequality driven preferences into policy, highlighting the relevance of domestic political economy.
BibTeX citation
@article{Parketal:2026gpi,
Author = {Park, Sanghoon, and Young Hoon Song},
Journal = {Journal of Global Politics},
Number = {2},
Pages = {forthcoming},
Title = {The Effects of Democratic Institutional Constraints and Income Inequality on Refugee Recognition and Admission},
Volume = {19},
Year = {2026}}