The aim of this study is to examine variance of redistribution in dictatorships and their systematic patterns. Unlike the previous researches, this study argues that the redistribution is displayed differently depending on the nature of the political institutions, which can restrict the decision of the dictator. It is expected that it would have a consistent and systematic impact on the policy choices by carrying out the role of the intermediary between the rulers and the ruled. To explore the effect of varieties of dictatorships on redistribution on the institutional level, about 89 dictatorships between 1986 and 2011 in the world are examined as a cross-national time-series data. As a result, the least redistributive dictatorship subtype is monarch and the most redistributive one is military. One-party dictatorship is less distributive than multi-party one. As a consequence, the models containing control variables under some conditions explain the systematic patterns of redistribution in dictatorships as well. Moreover, the systematic patterns mean that the policy choices of dictatorships are not contingent but intentional. Also, these results show the limits of previous political economic theories that are not sufficient to explain the dynamics of dictatorships.
This paper evaluates why authoritarian regimes design social policies to provide the welfare. Social welfare policies are coordinated outcomes that link the political and economic realms together. Despite a rich literature on this topic in industrialized democracies, little research has investigated the mechanisms in authoritarian regimes. I argue that the limited focus on welfare provision in democracies stems from several flawed assumptions about the ability of modern autocracies to create similar programs and the mechanisms behind it. Although autocrats are more autonomous decision makers than democratic leaders, they rarely rule alone. As such, social policies in authoritarian regimes are driven by the autocrats’ need to create stable ruling coalitions. The welfare provided in authoritarian regimes should differ depending on the groups on which the autocrat depends for support. The ability to effectively decommodify welfare and provide assistance should also vary based on regime characteristics and resource availability. I examine this using data on authoritarian regimes and social policies over the period 1917 to 2000, showing that authoritarian welfare provision depends on the ruling coalition in place.