How do institutionalized political parties affect civil conflict across regimes? We examine two competing explanations concerning the link between party institutionalization and civil conflict. On the one hand, more institutionalized political parties offer stronger channels for patronage, communication, and representation, which should serve as a mechanism for resolving conflict in both non-democracies and democracies alike by improving coordination among domestic actors. At the same time, however, more institutionalized parties may exacerbate civil conflict if they support interest aggregation and mobilization against a backdrop of limited freedoms. In exploring the relationship between party institutionalization and civil conflict across regimes, we take into account both nonlinearities as well as historical effects.
Developing measures for empirical description and analysis entails several crucial, interrelated tasks. The ﬁrst task is to establish, in concrete terms, the idea or concept to be measured. The second is to consider the most accurate way to measure the concept. After collecting data and creating the measure, another important task is to evaluate the consistency and reliability of the measure. In political science, the study of democracies—regimes that derive authority from citizens—and how they differ from non-democracies constitutes a major area of research. This bibliography covers works that have contributed to the development of empirical indicators of democracy and authoritarianism through their focus on the topics of conceptualization, validity, measurement, and reliability.
What motivates authoritarian states to participate in naming and shaming behaviors on human rights? The Universal Periodic Review is a unique process that requires all UN members to participate in peer review on human rights issues and has already finished its third cycle with active participation from all members since 2008. In this paper, we argue that authoritarian states use the peer review process as a means of legitimation. We expect the authoritarian states to be more lenient towards other authoritarian regimes to increase their legitimacy while being stricter towards democratic counterparts on critical issues to their regime stability. We test our expectations using a large-N sample of dyads in which we compare the peer reviews of the UPR between 2008 and 2019 with different dyads of democracies and authoritarian regimes.
What incentives do non-democracies and autocracies have to seek out, maintain, and establish membership in international governmental organizations (IGOs)? Despite the democratizing effects of IGOs, non-democracies are often active members in these organizations. Given this contradiction, we examine how the bureaucratization and institutionalization of political stability and economic performance in non-democracies encourage membership in different types of IGOs. Using a large-N sample of state-IGO membership from 1990 – 2020 of both democracies and non-democracies, we examine how the domestic political, economic, and institutional environments influence and variation in IGO membership.
This paper examines how different actors strategically behave under economic sanctions and how they might affect democratization. Although many scholars focus on the role of economic sanctions for democratization in target states, empirical support for their effects is mixed. I develop a formal model of economic sanctions and democratization that incorporates different preferences for economic sanctions and the role of elites and masses in economic sanctions with different conditions.
This paper evaluates why authoritarian regimes design social policies to provide the welfare. I argue that the limited focus on welfare provision in democracies stems from several flawed assumptions about the ability of modern autocracies to create similar programs and the mechanisms behind it. I examine this using data on authoritarian regimes and social policies over the period 1917 to 2000, showing that authoritarian welfare provision depends on the ruling coalition in place.
The aim of this study is to examine variance of redistribution in dictatorships and their systematic patterns. Unlike the previous researches, this study argues that the redistribution is displayed differently depending on the nature of the political institutions, which can restrict the decision of the dictator. It is expected that it would have a consistent and systematic impact on the policy choices by carrying out the role of the intermediary between the rulers and the ruled. To explore the effect of varieties of dictatorships on redistribution on the institutional level, about 89 dictatorships between 1986 and 2011 in the world are examined as a cross-national time-series data. As a result, the least redistributive dictatorship subtype is monarch and the most redistributive one is military. One-party dictatorship is less distributive than multi-party one. As a consequence, the models containing control variables under some conditions explain the systematic patterns of redistribution in dictatorships as well. Moreover, the systematic patterns mean that the policy choices of dictatorships are not contingent but intentional. Also, these results show the limits of previous political economic theories that are not sufficient to explain the dynamics of dictatorships.
This paper aims to explain why some british voters choose to exit from the European Union. Focusing on opportunities and threats presented by the integration of European labour market, we examine the reason behind remain' and exit' choices of British voters from the European Union. We argue that skill level of individuals matters since european labor market integration provides different incentive structure to laborers. European labor market integration pushes low-skilled laborers to harsher job competition with those of other EU member countries. Because inflow of low-skilled laborers to more affluent countries consists of those who are from the less developed countries, laborers with the lowest skill level living in affluent countries such as the UK face threats from the european integration. Using International Social Survey Programme 2013 module National Identity, we find that the lowest skill level has significant impact on voting choice: whether remain or exit from EU. This result of statistical analysis implies that some voters in the UK voted for exit because they believed that they don’t benefit from european integration, not because they are too ignorant or poorly educated to support european integration—exit voters are rational rather than ignorant.
This paper evaluates why authoritarian regimes design social policies to provide the welfare. Social welfare policies are coordinated outcomes that link the political and economic realms together. Despite a rich literature on this topic in industrialized democracies, little research has investigated the mechanisms in authoritarian regimes. I argue that the limited focus on welfare provision in democracies stems from several flawed assumptions about the ability of modern autocracies to create similar programs and the mechanisms behind it. Although autocrats are more autonomous decision makers than democratic leaders, they rarely rule alone. As such, social policies in authoritarian regimes are driven by the autocrats’ need to create stable ruling coalitions. The welfare provided in authoritarian regimes should differ depending on the groups on which the autocrat depends for support. The ability to effectively decommodify welfare and provide assistance should also vary based on regime characteristics and resource availability. I examine this using data on authoritarian regimes and social policies over the period 1917 to 2000, showing that authoritarian welfare provision depends on the ruling coalition in place.