Authoritarian Regimes

Institutionalized Parties and Civil Conflict

How do institutionalized political parties affect civil conflict across regimes? We examine two competing explanations concerning the link between party institutionalization and civil conflict. On the one hand, more institutionalized political parties offer stronger channels for patronage, communication, and representation, which should serve as a mechanism for resolving conflict in both non-democracies and democracies alike by improving coordination among domestic actors. At the same time, however, more institutionalized parties may exacerbate civil conflict if they support interest aggregation and mobilization against a backdrop of limited freedoms. In exploring the relationship between party institutionalization and civil conflict across regimes, we take into account both nonlinearities as well as historical effects.

Empirical Indicators of Democracy and Authoritarianism

Developing measures for empirical description and analysis entails several crucial, interrelated tasks. The first task is to establish, in concrete terms, the idea or concept to be measured. The second is to consider the most accurate way to measure the concept. After collecting data and creating the measure, another important task is to evaluate the consistency and reliability of the measure. In political science, the study of democracies—regimes that derive authority from citizens—and how they differ from non-democracies constitutes a major area of research. This bibliography covers works that have contributed to the development of empirical indicators of democracy and authoritarianism through their focus on the topics of conceptualization, validity, measurement, and reliability.

You Scratch My Back and I Scratch Yours

What motivates authoritarian states to participate in naming and shaming behaviors on human rights? The Universal Periodic Review is a unique process that requires all UN members to participate in peer review on human rights issues and has already finished its third cycle with active participation from all members since 2008. In this paper, we argue that authoritarian states use the peer review process as a means of legitimation. We expect the authoritarian states to be more lenient towards other authoritarian regimes to increase their legitimacy while being stricter towards democratic counterparts on critical issues to their regime stability. We test our expectations using a large-N sample of dyads in which we compare the peer reviews of the UPR between 2008 and 2019 with different dyads of democracies and authoritarian regimes.

Heterogeneous Democratization

This paper examines how different actors strategically behave under economic sanctions and how they might affect democratization. Although many scholars focus on the role of economic sanctions for democratization in target states, empirical support for their effects is mixed. I develop a formal model of economic sanctions and democratization that incorporates different preferences for economic sanctions and the role of elites and masses in economic sanctions with different conditions.

Why Do Authoritarian Regimes Provide Welfare Program?

This paper evaluates why authoritarian regimes design social policies to provide the welfare. I argue that the limited focus on welfare provision in democracies stems from several flawed assumptions about the ability of modern autocracies to create similar programs and the mechanisms behind it. I examine this using data on authoritarian regimes and social policies over the period 1917 to 2000, showing that authoritarian welfare provision depends on the ruling coalition in place.

Dictatorships and Redistribution

The aim of this study is to examine variance of redistribution in dictatorships and their systematic patterns. Unlike the previous researches, this study argues that the redistribution is displayed differently depending on the nature of the political institutions, which can restrict the decision of the dictator. It is expected that it would have a consistent and systematic impact on the policy choices by carrying out the role of the intermediary between the rulers and the ruled. To explore the effect of varieties of dictatorships on redistribution on the institutional level, about 89 dictatorships between 1986 and 2011 in the world are examined as a cross-national time-series data. As a result, the least redistributive dictatorship subtype is monarch and the most redistributive one is military. One-party dictatorship is less distributive than multi-party one. As a consequence, the models containing control variables under some conditions explain the systematic patterns of redistribution in dictatorships as well. Moreover, the systematic patterns mean that the policy choices of dictatorships are not contingent but intentional. Also, these results show the limits of previous political economic theories that are not sufficient to explain the dynamics of dictatorships.